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Abstract
The paper argues that an economy’s industry/technology structure is endogenously
determined by the economy’s endowment structure. For the convergence to occur, the
government of an LDC should target the upgrading of endowment structure instead of the
industry/technology structure in its development strategy. If the government chooses to
pursue an industry/technology structure, which is inconsistent with the comparative
advantage determined by the economy’s endowment structure, the firms in the
government’s priority sectors will be nonviable and the government needs to suppress the
function of market and distort all kinds of prices as a way to protect the nonviable firms.
Convergence will fail to occur as a result. Regression results from cross-country panel
data are consistent with the predictions of the above arguments.
Key words: Economic Development, Development Strategy, role of government,
Institution.
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Potentially, a less-developed country could narrow its income gap with the
developed countries by a higher rate of capital accumulation and by obtaining a faster
rate of technological innovation than developed countries through borrowing technology
from developed countries. However, such convergence has occurred in only a small
number of less-developed economies in East Asia. I will argue that the
industry/technology structure of an economy is endogenously determined by the structure
of its factor endowment and the government’s development strategy about the
industry/technology choice in a less-developed country is an important determinant about
whether the convergence will occur or not. If the government’s priority is to promote an
industry/technology structure, which is inconsistent with the economy’s comparative
advantage determined by the economy’s endowment structure, the firms in the priority
sector will be nonviable in a competitive market. In order to set up and to maintain the
survival of nonviable firms, the government needs to subsidize the firms with distorted
prices of capital, foreign exchanges, and other inputs, and to use an administrative
method to allocate the price-distorted resources to the firms. The functions of market will
be suppressed.  Rent seeking will be widespread. As a result, the performance of the
economy will be poor and the convergence will fail to occur. Only if the government in a
less-developed country follows the economy’s comparative advantage as the basic
principle for promoting the economy’s industrial development, will the economy have a
well function of market, borrow technology easily from developed countries, maintain a
high rate of capital accumulation, achieve a rapid upgrading of its endowment structure,
and result in the convergence. Empirical analyses of cross-country data show that the
strategy of following or defying comparative advantages in the choices of
technology/industries is an important factor in explaining a country’s success or failure to
converge with the developed countries. A less-developed country’s government should
therefore take the upgrading of the economy’s endowment structure as the development
target and improve the function of market and encourage the firms to exploit the
economy’s comparative advantages in the firm’s choices of industry/technology.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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I. Introduction
Since the industrial revolution in the 18th century, countries in the world can be divided
into two groups. The first group includes the rich, industrialized, developed countries
(DCs). The second group includes the poor, agrarian, less developed countries (LDCs).
Countries in the first group extensively use modern, capital-intensive technologies for
production, whereas countries in the second group mainly uses outdated technologies.
The wealth of developed countries results from their industrial and technological
advantages. How to industrialize their nations and catch up with developed countries
has interested not only political leaders but also many intellectuals in the LDCs since
the 19th century (Gerschenkron 1962, Lal 1985). After World War II, many
governments in the LDCs adopted various policy measures to industrialize their
economies. However, only a small number of economies in East Asia have actually
narrowed the gap and converged to the level of per capita income with DCs.1
I will argue that the failure of most LDCs to converge with DCs can be largely
explained by their government’s inappropriate development strategies. Most
governments in LDCs after World War II pursued the development of certain capital-
intensive industries as the priorities of their development plan. However, the optimal
industrial structure of an economy is endogenously determined by the economy’s
endowment structure. The firms in a government’s priority industries are not viable in
an open, competitive market because these industries do not match the comparative
advantage of the particular economy. As such, the government introduces a series of
distortions in its international trade, financial sector, labor market, and so on in order
to support the non-viable firms. Through distortions it is possible to establish capital-
intensive industries in developing countries. However, the economy becomes very
inefficient due to misallocation of resources, rampant rent seeking, macro instability,
and so forth. Consequently, convergence fails to occur. The government of an LDC
should make the upgrading of its endowment structure instead of the upgrading of its
industry/technology structure as its development goal, because once the endowment
structure is upgraded, the firms induced by profit motives and competitive pressures
will spontaneously upgrade their technologies and industries spontaneously. The
upgrading of the endowment structure means faster accumulation of capital, both
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physical and human, than the growth of labor and natural resources in the economy.
Capital accumulation depends on the economic surplus (or alternatively the profits)
and the saving propensity in the economy. If an LDC develops its industries along the
line of its comparative advantages, its economy will have the largest possible
economic surplus and the highest savings propensities and will therefore achieve the
highest possible upgrading of its endowment structure. Following this strategy, an
LDC could achieve a faster upgrading of endowment, technology, and industry
structures than the DCs and realize convergence. A firm's choice of
industry/technology depends on the relative prices of capital, labor, and natural
resources in the economy. Therefore, only if the price structure of the economy can
reflect the relative abundances of capital, labor, and natural resources will the firm in
the economy choose its industry/technology according to the comparative advantages
of the economy. The price structure will reflect the relative abundance of each factor
only if the prices are determined in competitive markets. Therefore, the government's
primary function for economic development is to maintain well functioning markets.
The rest of my lecture will be organized as follows: I will first present a brief
overview of recent theoretical developments and debates on economic growth and
convergence. I will then discuss the determinants of a firm’s viability and an
economy’s comparative advantages and their relations to the economy’s factor
endowments. This discussion is followed by analyses of a government’s alternative
development strategies, the statistical measurement of a development strategy, and the
econometric estimation of the impact of the development strategy on convergence.
The policy implications of the analyses are provided in my concluding remarks.
II. Growth Theories: An Overview
When the field of development economics started to take shape in the post-war
period, the development economists encouraged LDC governments to adopt
interventional policies to accelerate capital accumulation and to pursue an "inward-
looking" heavy-industry-oriented or an import-substitution strategy that directly aimed
to close the industry/technology gap with DCs (Chenery 1961, Warr 1994). These
economists were strongly influenced by the Soviet Union's initial success in nation
building, by the pessimism about the export of primary products formed during the
Great Depression, by the lack of confidence on markets, and by the neoclassic growth
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theory (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Prebisch 1959). Since the 1950s, most LDCs, in both
the socialist and capitalist camps, have adopted a variant of these strategies (Krueger
1992).
According to the seminal work by Robert Solow (1956) and others, the
neoclassical growth theory has suggested that the LDCs should grow faster than the
DCs and that the gap in per capita income between DCs and LDCs would narrow due
to the diminishing returns to capital in DCs and to the similar available technology
among DCs and LDCs. However, empirical evidences show that, while the
convergence occurred within the different states in the United States and among the
DCs (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1992; Baumol, 1986), most LDCs failed to narrow the
gap in per capita income with the DCs (Pearson et al. 1969; Romer 1994).
Unsatisfied with the neoclassic growth theory’s inability to explain the
continuous growth of DCs and the failure of most LDCs’ to converge with DCs,
Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988) pioneered a new growth theory, which treats
technology innovation as endogenously determined by the accumulation of human
capital, research and development (R&D), learning by doing and so on. The new
growth theory is insightful for explaining the continuous growth of the DCs, which
use the most advanced technologies. However, the new growth theory cannot easily
explain the extraordinary growth and convergence of the newly industrialized
economies (NIEs) in Asia, which includes South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore and recently China, during the last three decades of the twentieth century
(Pack 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
LDCs generally use technologies that are inside the technology frontier of DCs
(Caselli and Coleman, 2000). Technological innovation in a DC that adopts
technology on the new frontier can only be obtained through R&D or other
knowledge-generating mechanisms. However, for an LDC, technological innovation
can be a result of technology transfer or imitation of existing technology of the DCs.
Obviously, the costs of technological innovation through R&D are much higher than
the costs of imitation or other ways of technological borrowing. Therefore,
technology diffusion from DCs to the LDCs will facilitate the growth of LDCs. It is
futile in understanding the convergence between LDCs and DCs to focus primarily on
mechanisms that generate new technology.
However, the technological gap between DCs and LDCs is filled with a whole
spectrum of different technologies. An LDC is faced with the question of whichWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
4
technology is appropriate to imitate or borrow.
The idea of appropriate technology was first introduced in neoclassic trade theory
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), who formalized “localized learning by doing.” A
similar argument in development economics was made by Schumacher (1973). The
study of appropriate technology has been recently revived by Diwan and Rodrick
(1991), Basu and Weil (1998), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999).2. But the models
based on the idea of appropriate technology are inconclusive about the issue of
convergence. Basu and Weil (1998) consider the relatively low capital stock in a LDC
as a barrier for adopting the advanced technology of DCs. They conclude that an LDC
will experience a period of rapid growth by raising its savings rate to take advantage
of the advanced technology. However, their arguments cannot explain why
governmental interventions to improve the savings rate in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia excluding “Four little dragons” failed to speed up the growth rate. Rodrick(2000)
in a cross-country study shows that causality runs from growth to savings, not vice
versa. And, it would be quite difficult to take a rise in the savings rate as the trigger of
rapid growth. By contrast, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) stressed the disadvantages
of importing technology. In their framework, technology in DCs is used with skilled
workers. When the technology is transferred to an LDC, the technology is used by
unskilled workers. This mismatch between labor skill and technology can lead to
sizable differences in output per capita and total factor productivity (TFP). To
Acemoglu and Zilibotti, improving the skill base and human capital of workers, the
same argument made by Lucas(1993), is critical to income convergence. The
assumption adopted by Acemoglu and Zilibotti was too strong. They assume that
LDCs always adopt DCs’ frontier technologies rather than some technologies inside
the frontier.
The appropriate technology argument does not answer the question about what
the appropriate role of LDC government is in the process of economic growth.
Although the linkage of knowledge diffusion with an appropriate technology suggests
an alternative development path that differs from the development practices followed
by many LDCs, it is not clear if the government’s intervention matters to economic
growth, and if governments should adopt policies to improve the savings rate and
                                                       
2 There are also other economists who hold a similar idea about appropriate technology. Drawn from
the lessons of the East Asia Miracle, some economists, such as Takatoshi(1998), suggested the “flying
geese pattern” metaphor, to describe the characteristics of industrial structure and technological
diffusion during different development stages. But distinct policy proposals cannot be obtained from
this metaphor.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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human capital stock of the private sector, or if they should subsidize the adoption of
high technology industries directly.
III. Viability, Comparative Advantage, and Endowment Structure
The per capita income in a country is a function of the technologies/industries that are
found in the country. If two countries have an identical technology/industry structure, the
two countries should have a similar per capita income. To understand how the income of
a LDC converges to that of DCs, we need to understand how an LDC can narrow the
technology/industry gap between it and DCs. I will first define the meaning of a firm’s
viability and the relationship between a firm’s viability and its industry/technology
choice.
I define the term viability with respect to the expected rate of profit of a firm in an
open, free, and competitive market. If a firm through normal management is expected to
earn a socially acceptable normal profit in a free, open, and competitive market, the firm
is viable. Otherwise, the firm is nonviable. It is obvious that no one will invest in a firm,
if it is not expected to earn a socially acceptable normal profit. Such a firm will come to
exist only if the government gives it support.
In a competitive market, the management of a firm will affect its profitability, which
is a known proposition. The expected profitability of a firm also depends on its
industry/technology choice.
The isoquant shown in Figure 1 represents the different technologies of production
or combinations of capital and labor required to produce a given amount of a certain
product. The technology represented by A is more labor intensive than that of B. C, C1,
D, D1 are isocost lines. The slope of an isocost line represents the relative prices of
capital and labor. In an economy where capital is relatively expensive and labor is
relatively inexpensive, as represented by isocost lines, C and C1, the adoption of
technology A to produce the given amount of output will cost the least. When the
relative price of labor increases, as represented by the isocost lines by D and D1,
production will cost least if technology B is adopted.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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In a free, open, and competitive market economy that produces only one product as
illustrated in Figure 1, a firm will be viable only if it adopts the least-cost technology in
its production. In Figure 1, if the relative prices of capital and labor can be presented by
C, the adoption of technology A costs the least. The adoption of any other technology,
such as B, will have a higher cost. The market competition will make firms that adopt
technologies other than A nonviable. Therefore, in a competitive market with givenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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relative prices of labor and capital, the viability of a firm depends on its technology
choice.
In a competitive market, the relative prices of capital and labor are determined by
the relative abundance/scarcity of capital and labor in the economy’s factor endowments.
When labor is relatively abundant and capital is relatively scarce, the isocost line will be
something like that of line C in Figure 1. When capital becomes relatively abundant and
labor relatively scarce, the isocost line will change to something like line D in Figure 1.
Therefore, the viability of a firm in a competitive market depends on whether its choice
of technology is on the least cost lines determined by the relative factor endowments of
the economy.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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The above discussion can be extended to an industry that has many different products
and an economy that has many different industries. As shown in Figure 2, lines I1, I2, and
I3 represent the isoquants of three different products that have the same output value in
industry I. The average relative capital intensity of the three products is increasing from
I1 to I 3. As shown in Figure 2, the viability of a firm is determined by whether or not its
product and technology choices are on the least cost line, which is determined by the
relative factor endowments of the economy.
An industry can be represented by the envelope of the isoquants of all different
kinds of products in the industry. On the isoquant of an industry, each point represents a
specific product in the industry that is produced by a specific technology and has the
same value as any other product in the same isoquant. As shown in Figure 3, anWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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economy that has three different industries, represented by the three industrial isoquants
I, J, and K, will have the same output value. If labor is relatively abundant and the
isocost line is indicated by C, the economy has a comparative advantage in industries I
and J and a firm will be viable if it enters industry I (or J) and adopts a corresponding
technology to produce product I1 (or J1). Supposedly, as the relative abundance of capital
increases, the isocost line changes to line D. The comparative advantage of the economy
will change accordingly and a firm will be viable if it upgrades its product/technology
from J1 to J2 in industry J or it migrates to industry K and produces K1. The firm that
produces I1 in industry I will become nonviable.
From the above discussion, we see that the concept of a firm’s viability and the
concept of an economy’s comparative advantage are closely related and both are
determined by the endowment structure of the economy. If a LDC wants to close its gap
of industry/technology structure with that of a DC, it needs to close the gap of factor
endowments first.
IV. Alternative Development Strategies
The government is the most important institution in any economy. Its economic policies
shape the macro incentive structure that firms in the economy face. With the aim to
explain the success or failure of convergence in an LDC, I will analyze the
government’s economic policies toward industrial development and group them into
different development strategies. I will broadly divide the development strategies into
two mutually exclusive groups: (i) the comparative advantage-defying (CAD) strategy,
which attempts to encourage firms ignoring the existing comparative advantages of the
economy in their entry/choice of industry/technology; and (ii) the comparative
advantage-following (CAF) strategy, which attempts to facilitate the firms’ entry/choice
of industry/technology according to the economy’s existing comparative advantages.3
No countries in the world have followed either strategy consistently and without
amendments. However, some countries have followed a strategy close enough to be a
model of that strategy. A country that follows a particular strategy may also abandon it.
The switch in strategy provides good opportunities for careful analysis of the impact of
the strategy.
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IV.1: The Characteristics of Development Strategies
(i) The CAD strategy
Most LDCs are characterized by relative labor abundance and capital scarcity.
Therefore, in a free, open, and competitive market, the firms in LDCs will enter
relatively labor-intensive industries and adopt relatively labor-intensive technologies in
their production.4 However, political leaders and intellectuals in LDCs often equate
industrialization, especially heavy industrialization, with modernization and push their
countries to develop capital-intensive heavy industries and adopt the most advanced
technologies in their production as quickly as possible, that is, they want the economy to
develop some industry like K and produce product K1 when the isocost line determined
by their endowment structure is line C, as illustrated in Figure 3.5 With the given
endowment structure, a firm producing product K1 will not be viable in a free, open, and
competitive market. If a free, open, and competitive market is maintained, a firm
following its government’s strategy will incur a loss equivalent to the distance between
isocost lines C and C1. I will call this loss a policy burden on the firm. Because the
government is responsible for the firm’s entry/adoption of the industry/technology, the
government is accountable for the firm’s loss. Therefore, in implementing the CAD
strategy, the government must give the firm a policy subsidy to compensate for the loss
(Lin et al. 1998, 1999 and 2001).6
How large the subsidy is to compensate for the policy burden in the real world
depends on how far away the promoted industry/technology is from the economy’s
comparative advantages. If the distance is small, the government can rely on tax
incentives or direct fiscal transfer to subsidize the firm. However, this distance is often
very large when the government in a LDC pursues a CAD strategy and special
institutional arrangements are required for achieving the strategy goal.
When an LDC government pursues a CAD strategy, the most frequently used
method is to suppress interest rates by regulation in order to reduce the project’s capital
costs. In addition, the equipment for the CAD project, in general, cannot be produced
                                                       
4 For simplicity, I neglect the endowment of nature resources in the discussion. The propositions
derived from the discussion are also valid, if the nature resources are also considered.
5 The heavy industry was the most advanced sector in the past. Nowadays, the priority of the CAD
strategy in an LDC is focused on the information technology and other hi-tech industries, which are the
most capital-intensive industries now.
6 My focus in this discussion is on the development policies in an LDC. The government of a DC may
adopt other forms of CAD strategy, i.e., protecting its firms in an old industry that has lost its
comparative advantage due to the upgrading of the country’s endowment structure often for the
purpose of protecting jobs.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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domestically in an LDC and needs to be imported from DCs and, therefore, access to
foreign exchange is also required for the CAD project. However, foreign exchange in a
LDC in general is scarce and expensive as well, because the LDC’s exports are limited
and consist mainly of low-value agricultural products and resources. To lower the costs
of equipment imports for the CAD project, the government in general also overvalues
the domestic currency and undervalues foreign exchange.7
The distortions in the interest rate and the foreign exchange rate on the one hand
will stimulate firms, both in the priority and non-priority sectors, to demand more capital
and foreign exchange and, on the other hand, suppress the incentive to save and to export
and thus reduce the availability of capital and foreign exchange in the economy.
Therefore, there will be shortages in capital and foreign exchange and the government
will need to use administrative measures to ration capital and foreign reserves in order to
guarantee that the CAD firms will have the resources to perform the strategic task. The
resource allocation function of markets is thus constrained or even replaced by direct
government rationing.8
Theoretically, the government that adopts a CAD strategy will only be responsible
for giving a subsidy to compensate for the loss arising from the policy burden. However,
due to information asymmetry, the government cannot distinguish policy burden-
induced losses from operations losses. The firms will use the policy burden as an excuse
and use resources to lobby the government for ex ante policy favors, such as access to
low-interest loans, tax reductions, tariff protection, legal monopolies, and so on in order
to compensate for the policy burdens. In addition to policy favors, if the firms still have
losses, they will again request that the government offer some ex post, ad hoc
administrative assistance, such as more preferential loans. The economy will be full of
rent-seeking activities.9 Because the firms can use the policy burdens as an excuse to
                                                       
7 The distortions in the interest rate and the foreign exchange rate are universal for an LDC that
pursues a CAD strategy. In the socialist countries and other LDCs that adopted the heavy-industry-
oriented development strategy, the prices of raw materials and living necessities along with wages were
often distorted as well (Lin et al. 1996).
8 The government that adopts a CAD strategy can also ration capital to the firms that are not in the
priority industries. This in fact is the practice in the socialist planned economy. Certainly, the firms in
the non-priority industries will receive less capital than if the government does not adopt this strategy.
Alternatively, the government can allow the market to allocate capital after the firms in the priority
industries have been guaranteed rations. The interest rate will consequently be higher than it is when all
capital is allocated by the market. On the contrary, the wage rate in the market will be lower because of
the low labor absorption of the firms in the priority industries. Therefore, the firms in the non-priority
industries will adopt a more labor-intensive technology in their production than if there is no
government intervention. The above analyses are also applicable to the allocation of foreign exchange
to firms in non-priority industries.
9 The loss from rent seeking is estimated to be much larger than the loss from misallocation (KrugerWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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bargain for more government support and because it is hard for the government to shun
such responsibility, the firm’s budget constraints become soft (Lin and Tan 1999). When
the soft budget constraint exists, the manager of the firm will not have pressure to
improve productivity and will have more on-the-job consumption, and other moral
hazards. The subsidies could actually be much higher than the cost of the policy burdens.
(ii) The CAF Strategy
The government in an LDC could adopt the alternative CAF strategy to encourage firms
to enter the industries for which the country has comparative advantages and to adopt the
technology in production that will make these firms viable. As discussed, the industries
for which the economy has comparative advantages and the technologies that are
appropriate for production are all determined by the country’s relative factor
endowments. However, the managers of firms, as micro agents, will have no knowledge
or concern of the actual endowments. Their only concerns are the prices of their outputs
and the costs of their production. They will enter the industry and choose the technology
of production appropriately only if the relative factor prices reflect correctly the relative
factor abundances, which can be achieved only if the markets are competitive.
Therefore, when the government in an LDC adopts a CAF strategy, its primary policy is
to remove all possible obstacles for the function of free, open, and competitive product
and factor markets.
In the above discussions, I assume that the information about the product markets,
industries, and production technologies is freely available to the firms in the economy.
Therefore, when the factor endowment structure of the economy is upgraded, the firms
can upgrade its products/technologies or upgrade from a less capital-intensive industry to
a relatively more capital-intensive industry smoothly. However, the information may not
be available. Therefore, it is necessary to invest resources to search for, collect, and
analyze the industry, product, and technology information. If a firm carries out the
activities itself, it will keep the information private, and other firms will also need to
make such investment to obtain the same information. There will be repetition in the
information investments. However, the information has a public good nature. The cost of
information dissemination is close to zero, after the information has been gathered and
processed. Therefore, the government can collect the information about the new
industries, markets, and technology, and make it available in the form of an industrial
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policy to all firms.
The upgrading of technology and industry in an economy often requires
coordination of different firms and sectors in the economy. For example the human
capital, or skill requirements, of new industry/technology may be different from the old
industry/technology. A firm may not be able to internalize the supply of the new
requirements and needs to rely on outside sources for the supply. Therefore, the success
of a firm’s industry/technology upgrading also depends on the existence of an outside
supply of the new human capital. In addition to human capital, the upgrading may also
require new financial institutions, trading arrangements, marketing, and distribution
facilities, and so on. Therefore, the government may also use the industrial policy to
coordinate between firms in different industries and sectors for the upgrading of
industry/technology in the economy.
The upgrading of industry/technology is an innovation and it is risky by nature.
Even with the information and coordination provided by the government’s industry
policy, a firm’s attempt to upgrade its industry/technology may fail due to the upgrade
being too ambitious, the new market being too small, the coordination being inadequate,
and so forth. The failure will indicate to other firms that the industrial policy is not
appropriate and therefore they can avoid the failure by not following the policy. That is,
the first firm pays the cost of failure and produces valuable information for other firms.
If the first firm succeeds, the success will also provide externality to other firms,
prompting the other firms to engaging in similar upgrading and dissipating the possible
rents that the first firm may enjoy. Therefore, there is an asymmetry between the costs of
failure and the gains of success that the first firm may have. To compensate for the
externality and the asymmetry between the possible costs and gains, the government
may provide some forms of subsidy, such as tax incentives or loan guarantees, to the
firms that initially follow the government’s industrial policy.
It is worthwhile to note that there is a fundamental difference between the industrial
policy of the CAF strategy and that of the CAD strategy. The promoted
industry/technology in the CAF strategy is consistent with the comparative advantage
determined by the change in the economy’s factor endowments whereas the priority
industry/technology in the CAD strategy attempts to promote is not consistent with the
comparative advantage of the economy. Therefore, the firms in the CAF strategy should
be viable and a small, limited-time subsidy is enough to compensate for the information
externality whereas the firms in the CAD strategy are not viable and their survivalWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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depends on large, continuous policy favors/support from the government.10
A comparison of the successes and failures of industrial policies on automobile
production in Japan, Korea, India, and China is a good illustration of the differences
between the CAF and CAD industrial policies. The automobile industry is a typical
capital-intensive heavy industry. The development of an automobile industry has been
the dream of LDCs. Japan adopted an industrial policy to promote its automobile
industry in the mid 1960s and achieved great success. Japan’s experience is often cited
as a supporting argument by advocates of an industrial policy for heavy industries in
developing countries. Korea instituted an industrial policy for automobile production in
the mid 1970s. Korea has also achieved a limited degree of success in automobile
production. The automobile industries in China and India were started in the 1950s and
the industry in both countries has required continuous protection from the government
since that time. What explains the success or failure of a similar industrial policy? This
will be clear once we compare the per capita income of these countries with the per
capita income of the United States at the time when they initiated their policies (see
Table 1).
Table 1: Level of Per Capita Income (Unit = 1990 Geary Khamis Dollars)
US Japan Korea India China
1955 10,970 2,695 1,197 665 818
1965 14,017 5,771 1,578 785 945
1975 16,060 10,973 3,475 900 1250
Source: Maddison, Angus. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Paris: OECD,
1995, pp. 196-205.
Per capita income is a good proxy for the relative abundances of capital and labor in an
economy. Capital is abundant and wage rates are high in a high-income country. In a
low-income country, the opposite holds true. Table 1 indicates that when Japan initiated
its automobile production policy in the mid 1960s, its per capita income was more than
40 percent of that in the United States. The automobile industry was not the most capital-
                                                       
10 The dynamic comparative advantage is an often-used argument for the government’s industrial
policy and support to the firms (Redding 1999). However, in our framework it can be clearly seen the
argument is valid only if the government’s support is limited to overcoming information costs and the
pioneering firms’ externality to other firms. The industry should be consistent with the comparative
advantage of the economy and the firms in the new industry should be viable, otherwise the firms will
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intensive industry at that time nor was Japan a capital-scarce economy. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) only gave supports to Nissan and Toyota.
However, more than ten firms, resisting MITI’s persuasion of not to enter the industry,
also started their automobile production and all of them were equally successful, even
though they did not receive any supports from MITI. The above evidence indicates that
the Japanese automobile firms were viable and MITI’s promotion of automobile industry
in the 1960s was a CAF strategy. When Korea initiated its automobile industry
development policy in the 1970s, its per capita income was only about 20 percent of that
of the United States and about 30 percent of that of Japan. This may explain why the
Korean government needed to give its automobile firms much greater and longer support
than the Japanese government did. Even with the support, two of the three automobile
firms in Korea fell into bankruptcy recently. When China and India initiated their
automobile industry development policies in the 1950s, their per capita incomes were
less than 10 percent of that of the United States. The automobile firms in China and in
India were not viable at all.  Even up to today their survival still depends on heavy
protection from the governments.11
IV.2: Human Capital and Economic Development
In the above discussion, our focus is on the accumulation of physical capital and its
determining effect on an economy’s industry/technology upgrading. The role of
human capital in the process of development has received much attention in the
development literature in recent years. The recent empirical works that attempt to
explain cross-country income differences have included human capital as an
explanatory variable in the production function and have found that human capital has
a positive effect on economic growth (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992; Caselli,
Esquivel and Lefort 1996; Klenow and Rodriguez 1997; Barro 1997).
What is the role of human capital accumulation in the development strategy of an
LDC? If an LDC adopts a CAF strategy, the upgrading of its factor endowments will
be very fast and consequently the upgrading of its industry/technology will also be
                                                       
11 Most big push attempts by the LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s failed. However, there is a renewed
interest in the idea after the influential articles by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a, b). Their
papers show that a government’s coordination and support are required for setting up a key industry
and that the demand spillovers from the key industry to other industries will enhance economic growth.
However, for the “big push” strategy to be successful the pushed industry must be consistent with the
comparative advantage, which is determined by the relative factor endowment of the economy, and the
firms in the pushed industry must be viable after the push. Deviance from comparative advantage is the
reason why so many big-push attempts by the LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s failed.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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very fast. The upgrading is an innovation by nature even though the process is an
imitation of an existing industry/technology from more advance countries. The
managers/workers will face and will need to handle uncertainty in skills, production,
marketing and so on in the upgrading process. The managers/workers also need to
make many adaptations of the borrowed technologies to fit them to the local
conditions. Increasing the manager/worker’s human capital will increase their ability
to handle the uncertainty and to carry out necessary adaptations (Schultz 1975). When
a developing country narrows its industry/technology gap with DCs, it will move
from having mature industry/technology closer to newer, less mature, and more
uncertain industry/technology, which will require more human capital. That is, human
capital becomes increasingly complementary to the physical capital in the new,
frontier industry/technology.12 Because of the complementarity between the physical
capital and human capital, it is necessary to accumulate human capital along with the
accumulation of physical capital in the convergence process. However, human capital
is not a substitute for physical capital. An over-accumulation of human capital will
lead to the waste of a resource. After World War II, there were so many scientists and
engineers migrating to the U.S. from India and Latin America and other developing
countries. They made little direct contribution to the economic growth of their mother
countries. These scientists and engineers are not to be blamed, however, because the
low factor endowments structure in their mother countries made it impossible for many
of them to find suitable positions that would utilize their human capital at home.
IV.3: CAF strategy and CAD strategy: Comparisons
The attempt to catch up with DCs is justifiable for any LDC. The CAD strategy is
appealing to political leaders and the general public, including elite intellectuals, in
LDCs because most people directly observe the differences between the
industry/technology structure of DCs and their own countries and notice the correlation
between the industry/technology structure and the per capita income. However, a CAF
strategy will enable an LDC to catch up with DCs and a CAD strategy will in effect
stifle an LDC’s opportunity to catch up. Many other theories have also attempted to
explain an LDC’s success or failure in achieving sustained economic development. The
                                                       
12 In recent years, a variety of papers have argued that different technologies may display different
degrees of skill-labor or unskill-labor bias (Katz and Murphy 1992; Berman, Bound and Griliches
1994; Acemoglu 1998; Caselli 1999). This idea of skill complementarity has been employed to explain
the increase in wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s in the United States.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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CAF/CAD strategy framework provides a unified explanation.
(i) Capital Accumulation
An economy’s industry/technology structure is endogenously determined by its
endowment structure. Therefore, if an LDC wants to catch up DCs in its
industry/technology structure, it needs to narrow the gap in its factor endowment
structure with DCs first. The upgrading of the factor endowment structure means an
increase in capital relative to labor. Capital accumulation depends on the size of
surplus/profits accrued by firms and the rate of savings of economic agents in the
economy. When a firm in an economy enters the industry in which that economy has
a comparative advantage and adopts the least-cost technology in its production, as a
result of the CAF strategy, the firm will be competitive, occupy the largest market
share, and have the largest surplus/profits. Meanwhile, the capital in the economy will
have the highest possible rate of return when the capital is employed in the industries
of which the economy has comparative advantages. Therefore, the economic agents’
incentives to save will be highest. Moreover, the government will not distort the
prices of factors and products, nor will the government use administrative powers to
create legal monopolies. Therefore, there will be no scope for wasteful rent-seeking
activities. The firm will have a hard budget constraint and will need to earn the profits
through improving management and competitiveness.   The CAD strategy will result
in just the opposite to the CAF strategy regarding the competitiveness, the rate of
return to capital, the rent-seeking activities, and the softness of the budget constraints
for the firms in the priority industries. Therefore, the upgrading of the endowment
structure will be faster under the CAF strategy than under the CAD strategy.
(ii) Technology Transfer
The upgrading of the endowment structure in an economy will provide the basis for
the upgrading of industry/technology structure in the economy (Basu and Weil, 1998).
The industry/technology will be new to the firms in an LDC and will need to be
transferred from DCs. The learning costs will be smaller under the CAF strategy than
under the CAD strategy because the distance between the new industry/technology
and the old industry/technology is smaller under the former strategy than under the
latter strategy (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997). Moreover, the patent protections for
many of the targeted technologies under the CAF strategy may have already expired.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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Even if it is still under patent protection, the license fee will be lower with the CAF
strategy than with the CAD strategy because the targeted technology for the CAF
strategy is older than the CAD strategy ceteris paribus. In some cases, the firms under
the CAD strategy will not be able to obtain the technology from DCs and will need to
“reinvent the wheel” and invest in costly and risky R&D of technology by themselves.
Therefore, the acquisition costs of the technology will be lower under the CAF
strategy than under the CAD strategy.
(iii) Openness in international trade
A number of empirical studies show that more open countries exhibit stronger
convergence tendencies than do closed countries (Harberger 1984, Dollar 1992,
Warner 1992, Ben-David 1993, Sachs and Warner 1995, Harrison 1996, Michaely
1977, Frankel and Romer 1999). International trade is expected to facilitate
technology diffusion among countries. Lee (1995) finds that countries importing more
capital goods tend to grow faster, which means that new technologies may be embodied
in the capital goods. However, Rodríguez and Rodrik(2000) argue that
“methodological problems with the empirical strategies employed in this literature
leave the results open to diverse interpretations”. The role of the trade policies is not
clear. If the importing of equipment facilitates technology transfer, should the
government adopt measures to promote equipment importation or is it the best to
pursue trade liberalization in the sense of lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade?
In our framework, a country adopting a CAF strategy will rely on importation for
products for which it does not have a comparative advantage and exportation the
products for which it has comparative advantages. For this country, openness is
endogenously determined by the country’s factor endowment structure instead of an
exogenously determined parameter. If the government in an LDC adopts the CAD
strategy and attempts to substitute the importation of capital-intensive manufactured
goods by domestic production, not only will the country’s import trade be reduced but
its export trade will also diminish. The latter is because resources will be shifted away
from the industries for which the economy has a comparative advantage and the
exchange rate may be overvalued to facilitate the development of priority industries,
therefore, hampering the possibility of exports. The Socialist economies, India, and
the Latin American countries belong to this case. The growth performance of these
countries is miserable, compared with the countries that have adopted the CAFWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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strategy. The government in an LDC may adopt the CAD strategy and at the same
time encourage its firms in the priority capital-intensive industries to export. In this
case, the exports will not be profitable, even though the firms may have a high ratio of
exports to foreign markets and may achieve fast technology improvements.13 The
firms’ survival relies on the protection of domestic markets, preferential loans from
banks, and other policy support. The country will have poor external accounts,
accumulate foreign debt, and be easily affected by external shocks.14  It may be better
for an LDC to adopt a CAD strategy that encourages exports rather than a CAD
strategy that encourages import substitution. However, the overall economic
performance of a country that adopts the export-promotion strategy will be poorer
than the country that adopts the CAF strategy.15 Therefore, it is not true that a more
external trade orientation is a better policy for promoting an LDC’s growth.
(iv) Financial Deepening
Since the pioneering works by Shaw (1969) and Mckinnon (1973), many researchers
have argued that there exists causality between financial deepening and economic
growth in an economy. The indicator that is often used to measure the financial
deepening is either the M2/GDP or the value of credits by financial intermediaries to
the private sector divided by the GDP. The relationship has been supported
empirically by Levine (1997, 2000) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
However, the degree of financial deepening in an LDC to a large extent is
endogenous to the government’s development strategy. Under the CAD strategy, the
carriers of the government’s development strategy are the large-sized firms. To
support the financial needs of nonviable large-sized firms, the government often
nationalizes the firms and uses direct fiscal appropriation, skipping financial
intermediation, to support these firms, as in the former socialist planned economies,
India and other LDCs. Even if the government relies on private firms as the carrier for
the CAD strategy, the financial needs of the large-sized firms will be large and can
only be met by a heavily regulated oligopolistic banking system. In either case, the
                                                       
13 I met a senior manager of Hyundai Automobile Company in the United States in the early 1990s. He
told me that Hyundai was still losing money after 10 years of successful exportation of cars to the US
market.
14 Korea is a good example of this strategy.
15 Taiwan and Korea are good examples for comparison. Taiwan has followed the CAF strategy
consistently, whereas Korea has often attempted to switch from the CAF strategy to the CAD strategy.
The GDP growth rate, income distribution, macro stability, and other development indicators in
Taiwan are better than those of Korea.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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financial system in the country will be underdeveloped.  However, the most
competitive and dynamic firms in LDCs are the labor-intensive small- and medium-
sized firms. They are discriminated against and often denied access to financial
services. The financial system is thus very inefficient. Moreover, the firms in the
priority sectors that receive preferential access to bank loans are not viable. They may
not be able to repay loans. The banks often accumulate a large amount of bad debt
from the large-sized firms in the priority sectors, causing eruptions of financial crises.
A precondition for financial deepening in an LDC is therefore the change of the
government’s development orientation from a CAD strategy to a CAF strategy.
(v) Macroeconomic Stability
A bulk of empirical studies shows that the volatility of the macroeconomy could
hamper long-run growth (Barro 1997 etc.). If the government in an LDC adopts the
CAD strategy, the firms in the priority industries are not viable and rely on preferential
loans, trade barriers, and other policy support for survival. Because the existing
comparative advantage is not utilized, the economy as a whole will not be competitive,
a dynamic change in the economy's comparative advantage cannot be sustained, and the
economic performance of the economy will be poor. The economy will have a weak
financial sector and poor external accounts. The macroeconomic stability will become
unsustainable when fiscal deficits, debt burdens, and financial fragility accumulate. A
country that follows the CAF strategy will have better external accounts, healthier
financial and fiscal systems. The country will be better equipped to resist external
shocks and will have a much better record of macroeconomic stability.16
(vi) Income Distribution
The relationship between income distribution and economic development is one of the
oldest subjects in development economics. Kuznets (1955) proposed an inverted-U
hypothesis, suggesting that inequality tends to widen during the initial stages of
economic development, with a reversal of this tendency in the later stages. There is
mixed evidence for this hypothesis. A number of cross-sectional studies by Paukert
(1973), Cline (1975), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), and Ahluwalia (1976) support this
                                                       
16 In the recent East Asian financial crisis, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia were
affected slightly whereas Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand were hard hit. One reason for the different
performances among these two groups of economies is the difference in their development strategies.
The first group followed the CAF strategy closely whereas the latter group adopted the CAD strategy
(Lin 2000).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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hypothesis. However, the study of 43 episodes in 19 countries by Fields (1991) finds
that there is no tendency for poorer countries to yield increased rather than decreased
inequality or for richer countries to yield decreased rather than increased income
inequality. A case study on Taiwan by Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1979), however, shows that
the Taiwanese economy achieved growth with equity. I propose that the adoption of the
CAF strategy in an LDC will alleviate income inequality whereas the adoption of the
CAD strategy will aggravate the income inequality. The most important asset that the
poor have in an LDC is their own labor. The CAF strategy will result in a sustained
economic growth through the development of more labor-intensive industries, creating
more job opportunities for the poor, increasing the wage rates, and allowing the poor to
have a share in the benefits of growth. On the contrary, the CAD strategy, by
facilitating the development of more capital-intensive industries, will reduce job
opportunities for the poor and suppress the wage rates of the working poor. Growth will
not be sustainable either. When the economy breaks down, the poor will suffer the
worst hardship, as evidenced by the recent East Asian financial crisis (Stiglitz 1998).
IV.4: The Choices of Development Strategy
When development economics started to take shape in the mid 20th century, the
dominant view among development economists was to advise the governments in
LDCs to ignore their own comparative advantages and to adopt an inward-looking
variant of the CAD strategy, such as the heavy-industry-oriented strategy or the import-
substitution strategy. Proponents of the CAD strategy have often confused the causality
of dynamic change of comparative advantage. They have urged LDCs to disregard the
constraint of relative capital scarcity in its factor endowments and to directly establish
the same capital-intensive industries as the DCs. They have thought that the economic
development could be accelerated if LDCs bypass the stage of developing labor-
intensive and/or resource-intensive industries.
I argue that the alignment of industry/technology with an economy’s comparative
advantage is the key in facilitating the international diffusion of the technology, to
speed up the rate of economic growth and to realize convergence with DCs. The
dynamic change of an economy's comparative advantage depends on the dynamic
change of the economy's endowment structure, which depends on the rapidity of capital
accumulation in the economy, and which in turn depends on how well economic agents
in the economy exploit existing comparative advantages in their choices of industry/William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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technology. An LDC that takes the comparative advantage of its own factor
endowments as the guiding principle of its choice of industry/technology will minimize
the imitation cost, experience faster shifts in its endowment structure, and sustain a
continuous upgrading of its industrial structures. The development experience of the
East Asian “Four Little Dragons” is a good illustration of the merits of the CAF
strategy.
Like many other developing economies, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore
were very poor after World War II. In the early 1950s, their levels of industrialization
were low, their capital and foreign exchange were extremely scarce, and their per capita
incomes were very low. Like any other developing economy, they also faced the
problem of choosing an appropriate path for developing their economies. Taiwan,
Korea, and Singapore adopted an import-substitution CAD strategy to begin with but
soon gave up the attempt to develop heavy industries in the initial stage. Instead, based
on their factor endowments, they energetically developed labor-intensive industries,
promoted exports, and expanded their outward-oriented economies to utilize to the full
extent their economies' comparative advantages.
In developed countries, such as the European countries, the United States, and
Japan, labor-intensive industries were gradually being replaced by technology- and
capital-intensive ones because of the increasing abundance of capital and the rising
wage rates in their economies. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore had
abundant, inexpensive labor. Therefore, when the developed countries' comparative
advantages changed to more capital- and technology-intensive industries, the "Four
Little Dragons" were able to capitalize on the dynamic opportunities. Through trade
linkages and the openness of their economies, labor-intensive industries in developed
countries were relocated to these Asian economies. Because of the intensive use of their
comparative advantages, the "Four Little Dragons" were very competitive and were
thus able to achieve rapid capital accumulation. Along with the accumulation of capital
and the change in comparative advantages, they gradually upgraded to more capital-
intensive and technology-intensive industries. Therefore, the "Four Little Dragons"
were able to sustain more than thirty years of rapid growth, first becoming newly
industrialized economies and then reaching or nearly reaching the level of developed
economies.  The extraordinary achievement has attracted worldwide attention.
Most developing economies adopted the CAD strategy in the 1950s and
maintained that strategy for quite a long time. Why has Hong Kong never tried theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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CAD strategy and why did Taiwan, Korea and Singapore switch to the CAF strategy
shortly after trying the CAD strategy? Are these Little Dragons just lucky or is their
choice of CAF strategy attributable to the wisdom of their political leaders? Ranis and
Mahmood (1992) propose that the success is due to their poor natural resources. In
addition, I propose that it is also attributable to their small populations. The CAD
strategy is very inefficient and costly. How long this strategy can be maintained in an
LDC depends on how many resources the government can mobilize to support it. The
larger the per capita natural resources or the larger the population size in an economy,
ceteris paribus, the more resources that government can mobilize to maintain the
inefficient CAD strategy. For an economy with poor natural resources and a small
population size, the adoption of the CAD strategy will cause economic crisis very
soon.  By that time, the government will have no other choice but to be forced to carry
out reforms and a change in strategy (Edwards 1995). In effect, influenced by the
prevailing economic thoughts in the 1950s and motivated by the dreams of nation-
building, many political leaders and intellectuals in Taiwan and South Korea never
gave up on their desires to accelerate the development of the capital-intensive heavy
industries. However, their per capita natural resources were extremely poor and their
populations were very small. The implementation of the CAD strategy in the early
1950s in Taiwan led to an immediate huge fiscal deficit and high inflation, and soon
the government was forced to give up the strategy (Tsiang 1984). When Korea
adopted the heavy machinery and heavy chemical industry push in the 1970s, a
similar result also happened, and the push was postponed (xxx). Singapore and Hong
Kong are both too small in population and too poor in natural resources to implement
the CAD strategy.
V. Strategy Choice and Convergence: Empirical Testing
The various aspects of the CAF strategy and the CAD strategy, compared in Section
VI.3, can be empirically tested. Mingxing Liu and several of my other PhD students at
Peking University are attempting to use cross-country panel data and China’s cross-
province panel data to examine the implications of such comparisons. In this section, I
will focus my discussion on the choice of development strategy and its effect on
convergence.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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V.1: The Empirical Measurement of Strategy Choice
The CAF strategy requires that the capital intensity of an economy’s manufacturing
sector to be endogenous to the economy’s factor endowments.  That is, the optimal
capital intensity of an economy’s manufacturing sector Ki/Li can be described as a
function of the economy’s capital endowment K and labor endowment L as follows.
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To measure an economy’s deviation from the CAF strategy, I will first construct a
simple statistical indicator, TCI, the actual technology choice index of manufacturing
sector, which is defined as the actual capital/labor ratio of an economy’s
manufacturing industry divided by the capital/labor ratio of the whole economy. That
is,
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Figure 4 plots the relationships between TCI, per capita GDP, and the GDP growth
rate based on the data of 42 countries in the period from 1970 to 1992.17 As revealed in
Figure 4, there exists a negative relationship between TCI and growth rate, when the
income level is controlled.
Figure 4: TCI, Per capita GDP, and GDP Growth Rate
                                                       
17 The data of per capita GDP, the GDP growth rate, and TCI for 42 countries in the period from
1970 to 1992 are reported in Appendix I. The method for calculating the TCI and the data resources


































According to our theory, the government’s adoption of the CAD or CAF strategy will
influence the choice of TCI in an economy.
I will then define the optimal technology choice index of manufacturing sector,
TCI*. From the first-order Taylor expansion of Equation (1), we obtain


















                                      (3)
where  ω  is a constant. The optimal technology choice index TCI* is defined as
follows:








*                                    (4)
That is, TCI* is the optimal TCI at a given factor endowment of an economy. 18
                                                       
18 In addition to factor endowments, TCI* is expected to be a function of the stage of development ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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We can measure the government’s development strategy indirectly as follows:19
          ω / * / TCI TCI TCI DS = =                              (5)
If the government adopts a CAF strategy, we expect that  1 = DS . If the government
adopts a CAD strategy to promote its capital-intensive industries, we expect  1 > DS ,
whereas if the government adopts a CAD strategy to protect its traditional sector for a
purpose, such as employment, we expect  1 < DS .  The larger the deviation in DS  is
from one, the stronger the CAD strategy.  Although TCI* is not observable, the above
idea constitutes the major thrust of the econometric model to be analyzed in our
empirical study.
Obviously, the above indicator, based on the capital intensity in the
manufacturing industry, cannot capture the whole picture of a development strategy
and its impacts on economic growth. For example, a government may support a few
industries only, not all the manufacturing industries; or it may support only some large
firms in an industry instead of every firm in the particular industry. In addition, the
measurement of factor endowments is incomplete. In particular, skilled labor and
unskilled labor are not separated, and the differences in natural resources across
economies are ignored. Those are the subjects for future research.
V. 2: Empirical Specifications
The approach that will be used to test the effect of strategy choice is conditional β
convergence, as discussed by Durlauf and Quah (1999). I will first estimate a growth
equation derived as a log-linear approximation of the transition path of per capita GDP
around its steady state. Unlike the general neoclassical model, this approach explicitly
takes into account the possibility of multiple equilibriums in economic growth.20.
Consider the following equation:
                                                                                                                                                              
an economy and the relative abundance of natural resource in an economy.
19 This measure was first proposed in Lin and Yao (2001).
20 It is worthwhile to note that an alternative approach with a focus on the non-convexities in the
production function and poverty traps has found multiple regimes in cross-country dynamics with a so-
called polarization effect, in which the convergence rate varies according to time and the initial state
(Durlauf 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993). These findings suggest that the initial conditions matter in the
convergence. However, it is too simple to explain the success of the East Asian NIEs only through the
threshold effect because their initial conditions were not much different from those of other
unsuccessful Asian economies, such as Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
27
() () jt jt




λ + Χ + − + =
− + log 1
log log
             (6)
where  jt y  is the Per capita GDP of the jth country in year t; X is a set of explanatory
variables; and the constant C can be decomposed into country-specific and time-
specific effects, that is,  t j C κ µ + = .  jt λ , the rate of convergence, is not a constant.21
We attribute the dynamic adjustments of  jt λ  to the choice of development strategy and
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where 0 1 < β  and  0 2 > β . For the purpose of simplicity, we assume the optimal
technology choice index TCI
* to be a positive constant,ω,in a given period from t to
t+T. We take  1 β  as the natural condition under a CAF strategy. Thus, any deviation
from TCI*, induced by the CAD strategy, will reduce the convergence rate, because the
rate of capital accumulation and the rate of technological progress will be depressed and
the imitation cost will go up.
Substituting (7) into (6), we obtain the following specification
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where
       t j C κ µ + = ; ) log( 2 1 ω β β γ + = ; ) log( 2 2 3 ω β β − = .
Obviously, if the government adopts a CAF strategy, then (8) will reduce to the
general specification in the neoclassical model and, if not, the convergence may not
happen across economies. To be specific, if the government adopts a CAD strategy, γ
may be positive or negative. That is to say, the impact of the initial level of the per
capita income on the growth rate will be uncertain under the CAD strategy. For
testing the effect of strategy choice on convergence, we will pay special attention to
the regression results of  2 β  and  3 β . Based on our hypothesis, it is expected that
0 2 > β  and  0 3 < β .
                                                       
21 In the general setting,  ( ) () ξ ν δ α α λ + + − − − = p h 1 , where  h α  and  p α  are the production
elasticities of human capital and physical capital with 1 < + h p α α ; δ  is the depreciation rate; ν  is
the growth rate of labor; and ξ  is the rate of technology progress (Durlauf and Quah 1999). Since all
parameters are exogenously given, λ  must be constant in the convergence path.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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V. 3: Data
The data cover the period from 1970 to 1992 for 42 countries. The per capita GDP will
be included in the regressions in two different ways: the first is by a yearly observation
and the second is by an average at every five-year interval except for the period from
1990 to 1992.22 In addition to using the total sample, we also use a sub-sample of 29
countries, whose per capita GDP was lower than 8000 dollars in 1970 because of the
possible different role played by governments in DCs and LDCs.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP constructed as the
differences of the log values of per capita GDP, averaged over at a five-year interval or
at only one year.
The explanatory variables include several independent variables in addition to TCI:
GDP: The real per capita GDP at the beginning of the period, which is used as a proxy
for the initial condition. For the five-year average dataset, the GDP includes
observations for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. The estimated coefficient is
expected to have a negative sign.
GDP-1: The real per capita GDP lagged by one year. This variable is used as the initial
condition in the yearly dataset. The GDP figures are taken from the Penn World Tables
Mark 5.6, constructed by Summers and Heston (1991). They are calculated in 1985
prices (dollars) and also adjusted by the purchasing power parities. The estimated
coefficient is expected to have a negative sign.
Investment: The ratio of total investment to GDP including private investment and
public investment, provided by Easterly and Yu (2000). The estimated coefficient is
expected to have a positive sign.
Openness: The ratio of total value of exports and imports to GDP, provided by Easterly
and Yu (2000). The estimated coefficient is expected to have a positive sign.
                                                       
22 Generally speaking, the average over a given time horizon eliminates business cycle effects. However,
the arbitrary choice in the length of time may lead to a misspecification in the regression. In fact, there is a
lack of reasonable rules to allow us to analyze the degree of misspecification at higher frequencies or at
lower frequencies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
29
Inflation: The inflation rate, provided by Easterly and Yu (2000). The estimated
coefficient is expected to have a negative sign.
Education-p: The ratio of the population with education attainment of primary
schooling to the total population in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990, taken from Barro
and Lee (2000). The estimated coefficient is expected to have a positive sign.
Education-s: The ratio of the population with education attainment of secondary
schooling to the total population in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990, taken from Barro
and Lee (2000). The estimated coefficient is expected to have a positive sign.
Pol: The indicator for political constraint, constructed by Henisz (2001). The higher
this indicator, the lower the risk of political changes and the more decentralized the
political power. The estimated coefficient is expected to have a positive sign.
Dummy Variables for legal origin: According to LaPorta, et al.(1999), the origin of  a
country’s legal structure can be categorized into four systems: British, French,
German, and Scandinavian. We use the following abbreviations for this variable: BL,
FL, GL, SL. BL is used as the reference variable in the regression.
As for the regression on the five-year average data, TCI,  Investment,  Openness,
Inflation and Pol are all constructed with the average values of the same five-year
intervals, whereas Education-p and Education-s are the observations at the beginning
of the period. All the above explanatory variables in the regression are the natural
logarithms of their values. In the cases of the yearly datasets, the one-year lagged values
of TCI symbolized by TCI –1 are used as the explanatory variable. For Investment,
Openness and Inflation, the observations in the current year are used. The variables for
human capital have to be dropped from the regression because the dataset only has
observations at five-year intervals.
V. 4: Results
The empirical estimations are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the results
from the yearly dataset, whereas the results in Table 3 are from the five-year average
dataset. Models I and II in Table 2 and Models III and IV in Table 3 are theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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estimations from the two-way fixed-effect model, in which the country-specific effect
and the time-specific effect are controlled. The LSDV method is used to fit the data to
the models. The results of the Hausman test, shown at the bottom of Tables 2 and 3,
reject the null hypotheses of random-effect models in favor of the alternative two-way,
fixed-effect models. Models V and VI in Table 3 are the results from the one-way
fixed-time effect model, including proxies for political constraints and legal origins.
Models I, III, and V use the whole samples, whereas Models II, IV, and VI use the
sub-samples of countries with per capita GDP below US$ 8000 in 1970.
From the results in Tables 2 and 3, we see that  2 β  and  3 β  have the expected signs in
all Models, and the estimates are statistically significant, except for  2 β  in Models 1
and 5, in which data from DCs are also included in the samples. The results indicate
that the choice of development strategy in a LDC has the expected  significant impact
on the country’s path of income convergence to DCs.
Tables 2 and 3 also show that the estimates of investment, openness and inflation
are statistically significant and all have the expected signs as suggested in the
literature. However, the estimates for human capital contradict the general
expectation. As for the institution environment, a country’s legal origin seems to have
a stronger effect on economic growth than the political constraint. The results suggest
that the French and German legal origins are more favorable to an LDC’s economic
growth than the British and Scandinavia origins.
As discussed in section IV.3, the inflation rate, openness, and investment of an
economy are likely to be endogenous to the economy’s choice to development
strategy. Table 4 reports the re-estimates of Models I-VI by the reduced form
equations, which include only the exogenous variables. The sign and statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients of 2 β  and  3 β  are basically the same as those
estimates in Tables 2 and 3.

































Hausman Test 67.72 41.32
1. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
2. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance at the 10% , 5%, and 1% level.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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2 0.59512 0.65520 0.38537 0.42009
Hausman Test 25.75 23.9
1. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
2. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
Table 4: Regression Results without Endogenous Variables
Regression Results from the Yearly Dataset
(Two-way Fixed Effects)








































































2 0.16982 0.16731 0.42853 0.46800 0.26526 0.30766
1. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
2. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance at the 10% , 5%, and 1% level.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
35
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this lecture, I have argued that most LDCs fail to benefit from the industry/technology gap
and to converge to the income level of the DCs because most of them follow a wrong
development strategy. The temptation to close the industry/technology gap as soon as possible
is strong for LDCs. However, at a low level of factors endowment structure, LDCs’ economies
do not have the comparative advantages necessary for capital-intensive industries/technologies
and their firms will not be viable in an open, free and competitive market if they enter/adopt the
capital-intensive industries/technologies. To give priority to the development of non-
comparative advantage industries/technologies, the governments in LDCs often adopt a CAD
strategy and give the nonviable firms policy support through a series of distortions in interest
rates, foreign exchange rates, and other prices, and use administrative measures to allocate
resources with distorted prices directly to the firms in the priority industries. With the above
policy measures, an LDC may be able to establish firms that adopt high technologies in
advanced industries for which it does not have the comparative advantage. However, the
development of financial market will be repressed, foreign trade will be retarded, rent-seeking
activities will be wide spread, the macro economy will be unstable, income distribution will be
unequal, the economy will be very uncompetitive, and the country will fail to converge with the
DCs in terms of income.
I argue here that the optimal industry/technology structure of an economy is
endogenously determined by the economy’s factor endowment structure and that the CAF
strategy is a better strategy for an LDC’s development. This is because the CAF strategy will
induce the firms in an LDC to enter industries for which the country has a comparative
advantage and facilitate the firms in borrowing technology from the more advanced countries
at low cost. The economy will be competitive. The country will have a rapid upgrading of its
factor endowment structure and consequently, its industry/technology structure. As such, the
CAF strategy will help an LDC to converge with DCs. The empirical findings from the cross-
country analyses are consistent with the above hypothesis. To implement the CAF strategy, a
government needs to maintain an open, free, and competitive markets. The government can
also adopt an industrial policy to facilitate firms’ upgrading of industry/technology. However,
the functions of an industrial policy are limited to information sharing, investment
coordination, and compensation for externalities.
The government of an LDC plays an especially important role, for good or bad, in the
country’s economic development. As Lewis (1955, p. 376) has noted, “No country has made
economic progress without positive stimulus from intelligent governments, …  On the otherWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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hand, there are so many examples of the mischief done to economic life by governments…”
Here I would like to propose, for the government in an LDC to be an intelligent one, its most
important task is to get the development strategy right!William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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Appendix I:  The Average Per capita GDP, Per capita GDP Growth Rate, and TCI
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
GDP P.C. 11138.2 11859.8 12679.8 14170.2 14386.3
% GDP P.C. 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.022 -0.009
Australia
TCI 0.592 0.515 0.484 0.575 0.690
GDP P.C. 8258.0 9609.8 10601.0 11616.6 12833.3
% GDP P.C. 0.045 0.026 0.013 0.025 0.017
Austria
TCI 0.915 0.854 0.830 0.891 0.952
GDP P.C. 9043.6 10227.4 11026.4 11919.2 13375.0
% GDP P.C. 0.046 0.016 0.010 0.026 0.017
Belgium
TCI 0.774 0.763 0.752 0.998 1.318
GDP P.C. 11185.4 13229.0 14297.4 16600.4 16634.3
% GDP P.C. 0.041 0.029 0.012 0.032 -0.023
Canada
TCI 1.015 1.038 0.962 0.989 0.864
GDP P.C. 3702.8 3249.8 3609.0 3834.2 4566.3
% GDP P.C. 0.000 0.008 -0.018 0.051 0.038
Chile
TCI 2.144 2.198 3.256 1.891 0.662
GDP P.C. 2332.4 2683.8 2944.2 3139.6 3325.7
% GDP P.C. 0.041 0.027 0.005 0.022 0.009
Colombia
TCI 2.507 2.020 2.232 2.289 2.394
GDP P.C. 3108.4 3589.4 3301.4 3317.6 3504.3
% GDP P.C. 0.040 0.028 -0.035 0.014 0.011
Costa Rica
TCI 1.989 1.663 1.603 1.687 1.698
GDP P.C. 4179.2 4257.6 5660.0 7032.8 8712.3
% GDP P.C. 0.008 0.055 0.042 0.046 0.051
Cyprus
TCI 1.732 1.631 1.035 0.807 0.736
GDP P.C. 10183.0 10965.0 11653.6 13425.2 14005.0
% GDP P.C. 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.010
Denmark
TCI 0.705 0.801 0.904 0.965 0.854
GDP P.C. 1186.0 1412.0 1763.0 1914.4 1898.0
% GDP P.C. 0.011 0.052 0.045 0.000 -0.007
Egypt
TCI 4.319 3.971 4.183 3.767 3.307
GDP P.C. 1889.8 2194.0 1831.2 1826.0 1851.0
% GDP P.C. 0.014 0.023 -0.044 0.004 0.010
El Salvador
TCI 6.058 6.004 8.169 7.948 6.772
GDP P.C. 8799.4 9638.8 11241.0 12929.2 12907.3
% GDP P.C. 0.052 0.013 0.027 0.038 -0.057
Finland
TCI 0.890 0.894 0.836 0.914 1.051
GDP P.C. 9880.2 11019.8 11888.4 12871.6 13897.3
% GDP P.C. 0.036 0.021 0.006 0.025 0.007
France
TCI 0.930 0.820 0.790 0.889 0.990William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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Appendix I (continued): The Average Per capita GDP, Per capita GDP Growth Rate, and TCI
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
GDP P.C. 9888.4 11019.8 11930.0 13136.8 14598.7
% GDP P.C. 0.026 0.030 0.007 0.024 0.020
Germany
TCI 0.658 0.706 0.708 0.769 0.849
GDP P.C. 4754.8 5564.8 5943.4 6388.8 6773.2
% GDP P.C. 0.048 0.034 0.004 0.023 0.002
Greece
TCI 1.602 1.550 1.569 1.650 1.879
GDP P.C. 2135.2 2461.4 2371.2 2098.6 2175.0
% GDP P.C. 0.030 0.026 -0.033 -0.004 0.017
Guatemala
TCI 15.095 15.217 15.974 19.242 26.836
GDP P.C. 7856.0 9750.2 11774.8 13172.4 13095.7
% GDP P.C. 0.069 0.045 0.019 0.024 -0.022
Iceland
TCI 0.629 0.566 0.573 0.670 0.846
GDP P.C. 789.4 840.6 944.0 1140.8 1265.7
% GDP P.C. 0.002 0.018 0.037 0.041 0.012
India
TCI 9.747 9.315 9.746 11.456 10.934
GDP P.C. 787.6 1056.0 1485.6 1719.2 2040.0
% GDP P.C. 0.054 0.058 0.060 0.025 0.047
Indonesia
TCI 6.680 4.469 3.115 2.022 2.247
GDP P.C. 5368.4 6268.4 6974.0 7695.4 9435.3
% GDP P.C. 0.034 0.035 0.009 0.036 0.041
Ireland
TCI 1.079 1.188 1.256 1.399 1.304
GDP P.C. 6828.4 7371.6 8122.0 8787.6 9555.0
% GDP P.C. 0.052 0.004 0.016 0.018 0.031
Israel
TCI 0.767 0.826 0.905 1.061 1.124
GDP P.C. 7969.2 9044.4 10345.6 11508.6 12603.7
% GDP P.C. 0.038 0.025 0.014 0.030 0.013
Italy
TCI 1.254 1.315 1.426 1.499 1.475
GDP P.C. 7934.0 9030.2 10633.6 12611.8 14790.7
% GDP P.C. 0.044 0.032 0.028 0.040 0.032
Japan
TCI 1.626 1.855 2.458 2.339 2.029
GDP P.C. 765.0 862.6 862.0 869.6 909.0
% GDP P.C. 0.035 0.019 -0.022 0.019 0.000
Kenya
TCI 8.874 8.083 7.107 7.210 9.593
GDP P.C. 1928.4 2813.0 3483.4 5123.8 7157.9
% GDP P.C. 0.086 0.079 0.037 0.084 0.071
Korea
TCI 2.777 1.718 1.738 1.552 1.733
GDP P.C. 9757.4 10850.2 11100.6 11974.4 13168.7
% GDP P.C. 0.034 0.017 0.000 0.022 0.018
The
Netherlands
TCI 0.875 0.974 1.145 1.324 1.349William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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Appendix I (continued): The Average Per capita GDP, Per capita GDP Growth Rate, and TCI
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
GDP P.C. 10168.2 10316.0 10904.6 11619.6 11310.0
% GDP P.C. 0.039 -0.014 0.020 0.005 -0.012
New Zealand
TCI 0.669 0.602 0.767 1.039 1.115
GDP P.C. 8726.4 10770.6 12537.4 14588.6 15155.7
% GDP P.C. 0.035 0.043 0.028 0.017 0.020
Norway
TCI 0.697 0.668 0.700 0.729 0.851
GDP P.C. 948.0 980.4 1143.0 1323.8 1406.7
% GDP P.C. -0.003 0.024 0.027 0.029 0.008
Pakistan
TCI 6.886 10.085 12.439 11.516 11.739
GDP P.C. 2876.4 2981.4 2809.6 2681.8 2150.0
% GDP P.C. 0.037 -0.023 -0.017 -0.027 -0.024
Peru
TCI 2.729 3.247 3.600 3.212 3.878
GDP P.C. 1483.2 1734.6 1838.2 1618.2 1717.0
% GDP P.C. 0.025 0.031 -0.022 0.008 -0.009
The Philippines
TCI 7.929 5.022 4.724 5.983 4.243
GDP P.C. 4028.8 4590.6 5034.6 5721.0 7673.6
% GDP P.C. 0.087 0.009 0.005 0.056 0.060
Portugal
TCI 1.247 1.213 1.211 1.105 0.546
GDP P.C. 3381.2 3421.8 3524.8 3323.2 3167.3
% GDP P.C. 0.038 -0.016 0.009 -0.009 -0.028
South Africa
TCI 1.416 1.335 1.530 1.590 1.766
GDP P.C. 1246.4 1411.8 1778.0 2039.6 2165.7
% GDP P.C. 0.009 0.036 0.044 0.011 0.028
Sri Lanka
TCI 4.449 3.040 1.965 1.416 1.020
GDP P.C. 11110.4 11951.6 12636.2 14078.6 14370.3
% GDP P.C. 0.023 0.009 0.015 0.021 -0.016
Sweden
TCI 0.773 0.842 0.889 0.950 1.095
GDP P.C. 2701.8 3996.0 4377.4 3952.8 4057.7
% GDP P.C. 0.068 0.050 -0.009 -0.013 0.047
Syria
TCI 3.640 4.421 5.762 6.540 6.228
GDP P.C. 2624.6 3625.0 4778.0 6567.6 8576.1
% GDP P.C. 0.079 0.069 0.044 0.075 0.054
Taiwan, China
TCI 1.619 1.312 1.015 0.911 0.989
GDP P.C. 2432.4 2992.8 2906.2 3329.4 3738.0
% GDP P.C. 0.041 0.021 0.004 0.024 0.037
Turkey
TCI 7.813 6.312 5.942 4.306 3.414
GDP P.C. 9035.6 9840.2 10383.6 12291.2 12919.7
% GDP P.C. 0.025 0.021 0.009 0.039 -0.013
United
Kingdom
TCI 0.707 0.694 0.840 0.885 0.897
GDP P.C. 13680.0 14772.4 15447.8 17281.8 17864.3
% GDP P.C. 0.016 0.021 0.008 0.021 -0.003
United States
TCI 0.675 0.744 0.871 0.870 0.907
GDP P.C. 7525.6 7944.4 6874.2 6354.6 6586.0 Venezuela
% GDP P.C. -0.005 0.017 -0.048 -0.015 0.060William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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TCI 2.445 1.707 1.992 2.201 2.645
GDP P.C. 1199.2 1210.0 1278.0 1171.4 1197.3
% GDP P.C. 0.059 -0.027 0.003 -0.006 -0.003
Zimbabwe
TCI 3.473 3.662 3.299 4.118 5.814
Note: 1) For each country, the figures in the first row is the per capita GDP, measured in 1985 US dollars;
the second line reports the growth rate of per capita GDP; The third line reports the TCI.  2) The growth
rate of per capita GDP is calculated as follows:
    ( ) ( )
t T
GDP GDP t i T i
−
− , , log log
where i indicates the countries, t indicates the period, (T-t) is the length of the observation interval.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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APPENDIX II : The Calculation of TCI
Our calculations on the index of technology choice (TCI) can be divided into three steps:
Step I. Filling the missing values. One of the main problems in constructing the TCI index is
to obtain the time series of fixed capital investments in the whole economy and in the
manufacturing industry. Crego, et al. (2000) provided preliminary data sets for these time
series and the related deflators in domestic prices. To fill in the missing values, two methods
are used. First, we convert two kinds of the fixed investment and nominal GDP into the
constant own-currency values in 1990 using the investment deflator by Crego and CPI by
Heston and Summers (1991), and assume that the time trend of changes in fixed investment













where  t I  and  t GDP  are the real values in domestic price. The fitted results will fill in the
missing values of the fixed investment series. The second method is to use the ARMA model
for the fixed investment series directly. The results from the above two methods are highly
similar, and we use the results from the first method in the following calculation.
Step II: Calculating the physical capital stocks in the whole economy and in the
manufacturing industry from 1970 to 1992. As in Crego, et al. (2000), let  j s   be the
productivity ratio of the asset after j years of use and L to be the lifetime of the asset. Then,
we have
L T if K I s I s I s K
I s I s I s K
T t T t T t t t
L t L t t t
< + + + + =
+ + + =




1 1 1 0
1 1 0
where
0<sj<1, if 0 << jL ; s0 =1; sj=0，if jL ≥ .
More generally, the productivity of the asset will depreciate with time and, thus,  j s  can be
formulated by
L j s




< ≤ − − =
, 0
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where βis a parameter bounded from above such that  j s >0. When 0≤ j<L, this specification
also means
     dsj/dj = L(β  - 1)/(L - β j)2 < 0，
3 2 2 ) /( ) 1 ( 2 / j L L dj s d j β β β − − = >0,  if β  < 0
                           >0,  if 0 < β  < 1
                           =0,  if β  = 1,
which indicates that the productivity ratio will fall over the lifetime, and the falling rate
depends on the value of β . By assuming that  7 . 0 = β  and  10 = L , we can obtain the capital
stocks from the above method.
Step III: Calculating TCI. The formula for calculating TCI is as follows:






where  mj mj L K  is the capital/labor ratio for the manufacturing industry of j  country, and
j j L K  is the capital/labor ratio for the whole country j. The figures of  mj L  are taken from
the database on the manufacturing industry provided by UNIDO (2000). The figures for  j L
are obtained from Summers and Heston(1991).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 409
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